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ABSTRACT
A growing literature offers indirect evidence that the distribution of bargaining power within
a household influences decisions made by the household. The indirect evidence links household
outcomes to variables that are assumed to influence the distribution of power within the household.
In this paper, we have data on whether a husband or wife in the Health and Retirement Study “has
the final say” when making major decisions in a household. We use this variable to analyze
determinants and some consequences of bargaining power. Our analysis overcomes endogeneity
problems arising in many earlier studies and constitutes a missing link confirming the importance
of household bargaining models.
We find that decision-making power depends on plausible individual variables and also
influences important household outcomes, with the second set of results much stronger than the first
set. Current and lifetime earnings have significant but moderate effects on decision-making power.
On the other hand, decision-making power has important effects on financial decisions like stock
market investment and total wealth accumulation and may help explain, for example, the relatively
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A growing literature offers indirect evidence that the distribution of bargaining power 
within a household influences decisions made by the household.  Yet, earlier papers were not 
able to measure actual bargaining power.  We use information from a unique question in the 
Health and Retirement Study to analyze the determinants and some consequences of bargaining 
power. 
Models of household bargaining have two important implications for understanding 
individual outcomes.  First, the welfare of household members depends on the distribution of 
bargaining power.  Second, household decisions are not the outcome of a single individual 
maximizing utility.  Indirect evidence against “unitary” decision-making links household 
outcomes to variables that are assumed to influence the distribution of bargaining power within 
the household.  Such outcomes include the amount and allocation of leisure time, spending (on 
women’s and children’s clothes versus men’s clothes, on alcohol and tobacco, on food) and 
domestic violence (including female suicide rates).   
However, none of those studies directly show how individual preferences affect 
household decisions.  In this paper, we analyze data from the HRS reporting whether a husband 
or wife has “the final say” when making major decisions.  We interpret the answers as revealing 
whose preferences are reflected to a greater degree in household choices.  By directly observing 
decision-making power, our analysis overcomes endogeneity problems arising in many earlier 
studies and constitutes the missing link that confirms the importance of household bargaining. 
To undertake this analysis, we develop an econometric framework and pose a set of 
intuitive identification assumptions to make use of multiple subjective reports.  We find that 
decision-making power depends on plausible variables within the household and also influences 
important household outcomes.  Moreover, the second set of results is much stronger than the 
first set.  Current and lifetime earnings have a significant but only moderate influence on 
decision-making power.  On the other hand, decision-making power has important effects on a 
sample of financial decisions that we examine. 
In the first set of results, we analyze determinants of whether the husband or wife has 
more decision-making power.  We find that decision-making power depends significantly on 
relative household earnings, and more so on average lifetime earnings than on current earnings.  
However, the magnitudes of these estimated effects are only moderate for this older sample – 
switching average lifetime earnings of husbands and wives reduces the predicted percentage of  
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men reported to have the final say by their wives from 31.1% to 21.6%.  These estimates control 
for human capital variables that may be correlated with both labor supply and a comparative 
advantage in making important decisions.  They also show that cultural factors like race, 
religion, and immigrant status affect decision-making power. 
Next, we show that we can use this data to investigate outcomes that are both novel in the 
household bargaining literature and important.  As an example, we investigate two financial 
outcomes that are well-recorded in the HRS.  When husbands have greater decision-making 
power, we find that the household invests significantly and substantially more in equities, 
controlling for important factors like household wealth and stated risk preferences.  This shows 
some practical consequences of evidence found by others that men are less risk averse.   We also 
find an intriguing twist on the standard life cycle model.  When husbands have the final say, we 
find that household wealth is significantly and substantially higher the older is the husband but 
not the wife, and when wives have the final say, household wealth is higher the older is the wife.  
Thus, life cycle planning motives appear driven in part by the interests of the spouse in charge. 
Thus, our conclusions are twofold.  Our results show that household bargaining can have 
important effects on the welfare of household members.  For example, the relatively high rate of 
poverty among widows may result not only from aggregate longevity shocks, insurance market 
failures, and/or poor planning, but also from the nature of household bargaining earlier in life.
1  
This, in turn, has implications for the design of dependent and survivor benefits available 
through Social Security and for the impact of the shift from annuitized defined benefit pensions 
to lump-sum defined contribution accounts.  Our results also make it clear that more research is 
needed into the determination of bargaining power, as even important variables like earnings 
explain relatively little about the distribution of bargaining power. 
 
II.  PAST EVIDENCE ON HOUSEHOLD BARGAINING 
A.  Past empirical literature 
While most consumption and wealth data is collected at the household level, many 
studies have raised doubts that households can be treated as unitary decision makers.
2  
Theoretical work that began with McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1981) 
assumed instead that spouses engage in cooperative bargaining.  The resulting Nash-bargained 
                                                 
1  18.0% of widows aged 65 and over lived in poverty in 1997, compared to 13.1% of all elderly women and 13.3% 
of the total population (National Economic Council 1998). 
2  See recent surveys by Bergstrom (1995), Behrman (1995), Bergstrom (1996), and Lundberg and Pollack (1996).    
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equilibrium allocates marital surplus according to each spouse’s bargaining power.  Bargaining 
power depends in turn on spouses’ threat points, assumed most often to be their utility from 
divorce. 
Direct tests of such models are hampered by the unobservability of bargaining, threat 
points, and the allocation of marital surplus.  Consequently, the empirical literature has employed 
indirect tests of implications of unitary decision-making models.  Many of these tests rely on 
similar identification strategies, which we discuss in the next section, that test the “income 
pooling” hypothesis.  Under unitary models, the distribution of resources within the family 
should not influence outcomes like expenditures.  Empirical papers have shown, to the contrary, 
that variables which are plausibly related to threat points – like spouses’ wages, earnings, or 
unearned income – alter household outcomes over which spouses might have different 
preferences – like time spent by spouses on leisure and chores (Friedberg and Webb 2005); 
spending on men’s, women’s, and children’s clothing (Phipps and Burton 1998; Lundberg, 
Pollak and Wales 1997; Ward-Batts 2003), on alcohol and tobacco (Phipps and Burton; 
Hoddinot and Haddad 1995; Ward-Batts), and on food (Lundberg, Starz, and Stillman 2003; 
Duflo and Udry 2004; Ward-Batts); and child outcomes like health and education (Schultz 1990; 
Thomas 1990, 1994; Haddad and Hoddinott 1994; Rose 1999; Duflo 2003; Duflo and Udry).
3   
 
B.  Comparison to our empirical strategy 
Our approach offers three related advantages over recent studies.  First, we have actual 
measures of decision-making power.  Since earlier studies lacked such measures, they had to 
assume that the variables they studied influenced the distribution of bargaining power and were 
influenced by it.  We do not have to assume any indirect relationships.  Thus, our results 
constitute strong new evidence in favor of household bargaining models and about the specific 
nature of bargaining. 
Second, because we have a measure of bargaining power, we are not constrained as 
earlier studies were in choosing outcomes to analyze.  The studies mentioned above jointly test 
not only income pooling but also that spouses’ preferences differ over the outcomes being 
studied.  This is a key reason to study spending on men’s and women’s clothing, for example 
                                                 
3  In addition, bargaining is an explanation for rejections of standard implications of individual preference axioms 
using household-level data (McElroy 1981).  Examples include negative price elasticities and violations of Slutsky 
symmetry.  Proceeding from that, Browning et al (1994) and Browning and Chiappori (1999) found that testable 
analogs of non-unitary models that assume Pareto efficient allocations within the household were not rejected.  
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(notwithstanding possible public good aspects of clothing choices!).  It is less obvious, though, 
that men and women have different preferences for alcohol and tobacco, food at home versus 
away, and children’s well-being.  In contrast, we can directly test which outcomes depend on our 
measure of bargaining power.  While we lack data on many potentially interesting outcomes, and 
we must condition on appropriate variables as other studies must, we can examine outcomes like 
financial behavior which less obviously reflect the preferences of a particular spouse. 
Third, many of the variables which earlier studies used to explain the distribution of 
bargaining power were arguably endogenous.  To give an extreme but relevant example, it would 
be difficult to believe that omitted factors played no role in explaining a correlation between 
religion and spending on clothing, unless we can show (as we do later) that religion directly 
influences bargaining power.  More importantly, the earnings variation used in many tests of 
income pooling is not plausibly separable from the outcomes being explained.  If spouses earn 
more because they work more, that reduces time that is available for home production and may 
alter spending on clothing, food, children, etc.  Variation in unearned income is similarly 
problematic for reasons described by Lundberg and Pollak (1996).  The cleanest evidence, then, 
comes from quasi-experiments, but those are limited to particular settings and mostly involve 
poor populations (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales; Duflo; Duflo and Udry). 
   
III.  DATA 
A.  The HRS 
We use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a longitudinal survey of over 
7,600 households with a member aged 50-60 in 1991.  The HRS began in 1992 and collected 
new data every two years.  The HRS reports unprecedented detail about household 
characteristics, labor supply, finances, health, and so on.  We use data from the first wave in 
1992.
4 
Each spouse was asked the following question about decision-making power:   
“When it comes to making major family decisions, who has the final say – you or 
your (husband/ wife/ partner)?  By ‘major family decisions’ we mean things like when to 
retire, where to live, or how much money to spend on a major purchase.” 
                                                 
4  The question about decision-making was asked again in 1994, and 2/3 of individuals gave the same answer.  After 
that, it was only asked of new entrants to the HRS, a considerably smaller group.  We do not attempt to analyze 
changes in bargaining power, which would require not only a theory of dynamic bargaining, but also an approach to 
distinguishing measurement error from true shifts in either bargaining power or reporting bias.  
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Individuals could answer that they themselves had the final say, that their spouses did, or that the 
division of responsibility was “about equal”.
5 
Because the age range in the HRS is limited, the results are not representative of all 
households.  In particular, since they are older and some unhappy marriages will already have 
ended, the households that we are observing are more harmonious than average.
6  On the other 
hand, the greater marital stability of the sample offers an advantage.  We can view the observed 
outcomes as the steady state of a repeated game, and cooperative bargaining is more likely to be 
sustained than in a one-shot game.
7 
 
B.  The distribution of the “final say” in the sample 
We took the following steps in selecting our sample from the HRS: 
·  the HRS interviewed 7,607 households in 1992 
·  we selected couples, yielding a sample of 5,090 
·  we eliminated couples with no financial information, yielding a sample of 5,036 
·  we eliminated couples who were cohabiting, yielding a sample of 4,815 
·  we eliminated couples in which at least one spouse did not answer the bargaining question, 
yielding a final sample of 4,237. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of decision making power in our sample, and Table 2 
shows other sample statistics.  In Table 1, both spouses report that husbands have more 
bargaining power, on average.  When husbands answered the first question above (as shown 
across the bottom of the upper panel), 30.6% reported having the final say, 57.6% said it was 
about equal, and 11.8% reported that the wife had the final say.  When the 30.6% of husbands 
with the final say answered the second question above (as shown in the lower panel), roughly 
                                                 
5  People were asked a follow-up question if they did not answer “about equal”:  either, “Do you have a lot more say 
than your (husband/ wife/ partner), somewhat more, or only a little more?”, or, vice versa.  The answers to this 
second question did not provide us with significant additional information.  In ordered probits, the estimated 
threshold values are not significantly different from each other when we try to explain answers to the second 
question, but they are when we try to explain answers to the first question in the estimates we report later. 
6  While the value of observed marriages in the HRS should be higher than the value of a representative marriage 
and thus disagreement should be less likely, this does not have clear-cut implications about the observed distribution 
of bargaining power relative to the underlying distribution for all couples.  We find that controlling for the duration 
of marriage has no impact on the other coefficient estimates.  Interestingly, we find smaller estimated effects of 
earnings on bargaining power in second marriages, perhaps because people enter a second marriage with more 
information about the likely distribution of bargaining power. 
7  Because we find significant effects later on, we believe that these answers are informative.  Thus, it seems 
unlikely that one spouse has more power but delegates decision-making to the other spouse, knowing that the 
decisions will reflect their own preferences.  
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one-quarter reported having a lot more say, and the rest reported having somewhat or a little 
more say. 
The marginal distribution of wives’ answers to the first question is similar to husbands’.  
16.0% of wives reporting that they themselves have the final say, 52.7% answering that it was 
about equal, and 31.3% reporting that their husbands have the final say. 
Disagreements are apparent in the off-diagonal cells in the upper panel of Table 1.  Spouses 
agreed on the answer 63.3% of the time.  84.2% of the disagreements occurred in adjacent cells, 
while the rest involved one spouse answering the wife and the other answering the husband.  
About 2/3 of these adjacent disagreements leaned toward the husband, with one spouse 
attributing more power to the husband and the other reporting equal power.  It was also a little 
more common for disagreeing spouses to attribute extra power to themselves relative to the other 
spouse’s opinion (adding together cells in the lower left) than it was for them to attribute extra 
power to the other spouse (cells in the upper right). 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
We interpret answers to the question about decision-making power as revealing which 
spouse’s preferences are reflected to a greater degree in household decisions.
8  However, we treat 
the answers as noisy measures of true decision-making power, both because the answers are 
discrete and because of the disagreements revealed in Table 1.  Moreover, disagreements are 
correlated with some of our important explanatory variables in the results we present later. 
In this section, we offer an econometric framework that suggests intuitive identification 
assumptions to disentangle these features.  We first present a framework to deal with noisy, 
continuous measures of bargaining power, and then noisy, discrete measures.  While the 
identification assumptions influence the interpretation of the reported coefficient estimates, they 
are not actually imposed in the process of estimation, so uninterested readers can proceed 
directly to the next section for the estimation results. 
 
A.  Estimating the determinants of noisy continuous measures of true bargaining power 
                                                 
8  Household theory has emphasized the generalized Nash model of cooperative bargaining, in which the allocation 
of resources (Uh, Uw) maximizes (Uh-Rh)
q(Uw-Rw)
1-q, where Rj are reservation values and 0<q<1 is h’s relative 
bargaining weight.  The equilibrium allocation Uj  will depend on R and q, and we view our measure of decision-
making power (which we also refer to on occasion as “bargaining power”) as an amalgam of Rh,  Rw, and q.  In 
comparison, empirical tests of income pooling seek to determine whether components of R influence components of 
U.  A natural extension of our work would be to incorporate additional information and estimate the full Nash-
bargaining model, as several papers have done in labor market settings (cf. Flinn forthcoming).  
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We assume for the moment that spouses report continuous (rather than discrete) measures 
of bargaining power.  We will focus first on determining how bargaining power, measured 
continuously, depends on household characteristics and then how it influences household 
outcomes.  We will denote true bargaining power of a husband relative to his wife in household i 
by yi*.  We will treat true bargaining power yi* as a function of observables X and an 
uncorrelated homoscedastic error term: 
(1)  yi* = Xia + ui . 
We do not observe yi* but rather the belief yji* about true bargaining power that each spouse j = 
{h,w} in household i reports.  We write these beliefs as  
(2a)  ywi* = yi* + Xibw + uwi  
(2b)  yhi* = yi* + Xibh + uhi , 
so j’s report about the husband’s relative bargaining power depends on his true bargaining power 
but also on some reporting bias Xibj and another uncorrelated homoscedastic error term. 
Before proceeding with estimation issues, we will clarify some important identifying 
assumptions that lie behind (1)-(2b).  First, the model assumes that the “true” measure of 
decision-making power yi
*, rather than the reported measures yji*, influence household decisions.  
Otherwise, we might have to consider a model of multi-dimensional bargaining in order to 
reconcile conflicting reports that are both true.
9  Second, the model assumes specific forms of 
heterogeneity in how everyone reports yji*.  Answers may disagree or not as a function of 
observables and error terms, but it assumes that couples whose answers disagree or not do not 
fundamentally differ in either how they answer the question or how they bargain. 
To proceed, we can rewrite each spouse’s report of bargaining power in (2a) and (2b) as 
    ywi* = Xi (a+bw) + ui + uwi  
    yhi* = Xi (a+bh) + ui + uhi , 
but, of course, we can only estimate the empirical analogs 
(3a)  ywi* = Xi bw +  wi u ~  
(3b)  yhi* = Xi bh +  hi u ~  . 
Thus, we have an identification problem since bj = a + bj combines the “true effect” a of X on 
y* and the “reporting bias” bj also engendered by X.  
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In order to identify the true effect a, we propose the following restriction: 
    (4)  bh + bw = 0 . 
This condition requires that any disagreements between spouses about true bargaining power be 
equal and opposite in sign, so that they balance out on average across the sample. 
This restriction is an intuitive extension of the assumption that respondents provide 
unbiased information.  As an example, consider our result later that a wife’s (W’s) earnings 
reduces her husband’s (H’s) bargaining power but by amounts that are disagreed on.  Suppose 
that higher W’s earnings reduce true yi by an average of 0.5.  A symmetric disagreement arises if 
higher W’s earnings lead Ws to claim a greater drop and Hs to claim a smaller drop.  If instead 
they disagreed in the same direction (e.g., Hs and Ws report average reductions of 0.6 and 0.7, 
respectively), then we could not identify the true effect on bargaining power (which we would 
infer lies between 0.6 and 0.7) from this systematic reporting bias.  Instead, we infer that 
anything that moves both spouses’ reports in the same direction is the truth.  Similarly, if the 
disagreement were opposite in direction but not symmetric (e.g., Hs and Ws report average 
reductions of 0.4 and 0.7), then we would correctly infer that the truth lies in between 0.4 and 
0.7, but we would incorrectly infer where.
10  This assumption makes sense as long as, once 
again, both spouses interpret the question in the same way, on average.
11 
Once we estimate (3a) and (3b) and then impose (4), we can recover the underlying 
parameters of interest.  Since bh = a + bh and bw = a + bw, it can be shown that 
    (5a)  a = (bh + bw)/2 
    (5b)  bj = bj - a = bj - (bh + bw)/2 . 
                                                                                                                                                             
9  In such a model, spouses might report different answers because they engage in distinct bargaining over different 
decisions.  Such models are theoretically intractable and would be difficult to identify using our data, since we 
would not know what “sphere” of bargaining each spouse has in mind when answering the question. 
10  We could generalize (4) by incorporating asymmetric effects of X on disagreement, such that bh+bw = b   
" |bj|  ³ |b| .  This allows bh and bw to differ in magnitude as long as they also differ in sign but does not yield point 
identification of a and bj.  If we suspected that an element of X had a greater effect on one spouse’s reporting bias 
than on the other’s, then b > 0 and we would know that the estimate of a ˆ  was an upper bound on the true a.  Also, 
we could determine how large b (the asymmetry of disagreement) would have to be in order to undermine inference 
about the true sign of a. 
11  The HRS reported whether the other spouse was present and intervened much during an individual’s interview.  
We find that wives are much more likely to be present for their husband’s interviews, and that a spouse’s presence is 
not systematically related to reported bargaining power.  The theoretical implication is ambiguous – a spouse with 
more bargaining power may directly exercise control over the less powerful spouse’s answers or may be confident 
of indirect control that makes intervention unnecessary.  When we try controlling for the presence of the other 
spouse in the estimation, there is little qualitative impact on the estimated effect of earnings, which is our primary 
interest.  It alters the estimated effect of some demographic and cultural variables (i.e., race, religion, children).   
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Thus, our estimate of the true effect a ˆ  equals the average of  h b ˆ  and  w b ˆ , and our estimate of the 
reporting bias  j ˆ b  equals  j b ˆ  minus a ˆ .  In cases where there is little disagreement,  w b ˆ »  h b ˆ , so 
j b ˆ » a ˆ  and  j ˆ b » 0.
12  A final issue is whether the errors in the reporting equations (2a)-(2b) and 
hence the estimating equations (3a)-(3b) are correlated.
13  We test this hypothesis later on and 
find a large, positive, statistically significant correlation. 
 
B.  Estimating the consequences of noisy continuous measures of true bargaining power 
Using noisy measures of bargaining power also affects how we interpret estimates of the 
consequences of decision-making power on household outcomes.  Suppose some outcome zi 
depends on true continuous but unobserved bargaining power yi*, as defined in (1), and on X 
(which affect true and reported bargaining power as well) and an uncorrelated homoscedastic 
error term, so that 
(6)  zi = g yi* + Xid + vi . 
We can substitute (2a) and (2b) to obtain  
zi = g ywi* + Xi (d - gbw) + vi - guwi 
zi = g yhi* + Xi (d - gbh) + vi - guhi  
and then add these together to arrive at 
(7)  zi = g( 
2
* y * y wi hi +
) + Xi (d -
2
g
 (bw + bh))+ vi -
2
g
(uwi + uhi) . 
The empirical analog of (7) is 
(8)  zi = c(
2
* y * y wi hi +
) + Xi d + v ~ . 
If we estimate (8) and invoke the assumption in (4) that bh+bw = 0, then we can recover the true 
parameters from (6), which are simply g = c and d = d  The key point is that averaging yhi* and 
ywi* in the estimation cancels out the disagreement effects bj. 
 
 
                                                 
12  In this framework, we cannot identify the true effect a by limiting the sample to couples who report the same 
answers for y.  It is not the case that such couples have no reporting bias, but rather that their reporting errors uji 
happen to offset their reporting bias Xibj, that they have systematically lower values of variables associated with 
high reporting bias and vice versa, etc.  With that in mind, we will mention the effect of limiting the sample when 
we present the estimation results later. 
13  We cannot identify a correlation between the disturbance in the true equation (1) and the reporting equations (2a)-
(2b) without making a further assumption, analogous to (4), about the nature of the correlation.  
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C.  Estimating the causes and consequences of discrete measures of bargaining power  
At this point, we will address the fact that our observed reports of bargaining power are 
discrete rather than continuous.  In order to estimate the determinants of bargaining power, we 
continue to assume that (1)-(2b) hold, with yji* now being some underlying continuous measure 
that we only observe discretely: 
(9)  yji = {husband has final say, about equal, wife has final say} = {1, 0, -1}  
Assuming further that  ji u ~ ~  ) , ( N
2 0 s  yields an ordered probit framework that is the discrete 
choice analog to (3a) and (3b), where the contribution of each possible outcome of yji to the log 
likelihood function is 
    (10)  P(yji = -1) = F(m0 - Xibj) 
      P(yji = 0) = F(m1 - Xibj)  - F(m0 - Xibj) 
      P(yji = 1) = 1 - F(m1 - Xibj) , 
and m0 and m1 are threshold values to be estimated.  Since the relationship bj = a + bj continues 
to hold, then, after imposing (4), the same conditions (5a) and (5b) govern identification.  Lastly, 
we will estimate a bivariate ordered probit that allows the errors  ji u ~  to be correlated for spouses 
j within a household i.  Such a correlation may be expected if spouses share important 
characteristics that influence both bargaining and reports about bargaining and that are not 
observed in the data. 
When we consider estimating the consequences of our noisy, discrete measure of 
bargaining power, the estimation strategy outlined in (8) becomes more complicated since we do 
not observe the continuous variables yji*.  We deal with this using three approaches.
14 
·  We try a two-stage procedure:  first, estimate the ordered probits that determine bargaining 
power as laid out in (3a) and (3b) and obtain the predicted values  * y ˆ ji  =  j ib ˆ X ; second, 
substitute those into (8) and estimate the impact of bargaining power.  The difficulty with this 
approach is in determining how to adjust the standard errors in the second stage.
15 
                                                 
14  Another approach which we will not use would be a joint estimation strategy that allows the error terms 
determining yhi*, ywi*, and zi to be correlated.  This approach would get rapidly more complicated as we analyze 
additional outcomes z, though, so we limit the joint estimation to yhi* and ywi*. 
15  Maddala (1983, Section 8.8) lays out estimators and, in some cases, covariance matrices for related examples in 
which the first and/or second stages are specified discretely.  None pertain directly to the situation here, and for the 
most similar cases, he notes, “The derivation of the asymptotic covariance matrix of the two-stage estimates is very 
complicated and will not be attempted here,” (pp.245, 246).  We do not attempt it either.  
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·  We also try a more efficient alternative with correct standard errors, derived from 
Amemiya (1979) and described in detail in the Appendix:  first, estimate the first-stage 
relationship in (3a) and (3b) as described above; second, estimate the reduced form obtained 
from substituting the determinants of yji*, as laid out in (3a) and (3b), into the second-stage 
relationship in (8); third, estimate the structural parameters of the impact of bargaining power 
based on the resulting parameter restrictions. 
·  Lastly, we try a non-structural alternative that controls for the raw answers on decision-
making power.  This approach does not rely on the functional form represented by (1)-(2b) 
that we assumed in the first stage, but it revives the difficulty of extracting information from 
the discrete and sometimes conflicting answers of spouses. 
Using either of the structural approaches, we now face an additional constraint because 
* y ˆ ji  is a linear function of the explanatory variables X which also appear linearly in (8).  
Therefore, we must exclude one or more elements of X so that we can identify the impact g of yi* 
on z.
16  To this end, we will argue that total household earnings should affect outcomes z that we 
analyze, but that the split between husband’s and wife’s earnings should not, except through their 
influence on bargaining power. 
 
V.  WHAT INFLUENCES BARGAINING POWER? 
In this section, we analyze the empirical determinants of decision-making power.  We 
estimate bivariate ordered probits on both spouses’ answers yji about decision-making power, 
coded as {1,0,-1} = {husband has final say, about equal, wife has final say}.  We hypothesize 
that labor market opportunities of each spouse affects threat points and in turn bargaining power.  
To test this, we explore the impact of current and past earnings and other labor market 
variables.
17 
The HRS offers a great deal of information to control for other factors that may affect 
both threat points and decision making.  For example, a spouse who is “savvier” than the other 
may be more likely to work and make major decisions, inducing a spurious correlation.  To deal 
                                                 
16  If we observed the continuous values yji*, then the variation in reported bargaining power that is uncorrelated 
with X would identify the impact of y* on z. 
17  Pollak (2005) laid out the case that the wage, rather than earnings, is the appropriate proxy for the bargaining 
threat point, as hours of work may differ across bargaining equilibria.  Measuring the marginal wage accurately for 
this age group proved difficult, though, as salaried jobs are the norm.  Moreover, total earnings might better proxy 
the threat point in this case, since hours adjustments are difficult at this age; for example, a non-working spouse may 
find it difficult at this age  to exercise what earlier was a legitimate threat to earn a high wage by returning to work.  
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with this, we control for each spouse’s human capital as reflected by education, cognition, and 
health.
18  Cultural background and social norms may be correlated with both threat points and 
decision-making power, so we control for numerous background variables – race, hispanic 
ethnicity, immigrant status, religious background, and father and mother’s education.  We find 
that many of these variables have statistically significant effects on decision-making power, 
although ethnic variables also have the strongest effects on disagreements. 
  
A.  The impact of husband’s and wife’s earnings 
We show estimation results for various specifications of labor market variables 
(including current earnings, earnings histories, and others) in bivariate ordered probits estimated 
jointly on both spouses’ responses.  Throughout these specifications, we obtain a positive, 
significant correlation coefficient of around 0.45.
19  Thus, conditioning on observables, both 
spouses agree about who has decision-making power on average, but not perfectly. 
After reviewing various specifications, we will decompose the parameter estimates from 
some preferred specifications into the “true” and the “disagreement” or “bias” effects that result 
from imposing (4).  Then, we will discuss the magnitude of the estimated effects on the 
distribution of decision-making power.  In the meantime, recall that the estimated effect a ˆ  of a 
variable on true decision-making power equals the average of its estimated effects  h b ˆ  and  w b ˆ  on 
husbands’ and wives’ reports, which we discuss next.  Also, the importance of any particular 
variable can be gauged by comparing its coefficient to the estimated threshold values  0 m ˆ  and  1 m ˆ , 
based on (10). 
Current earnings (Table 3-A).  We generally find that earnings have a significant effect 
on decision-making power.  In our first set of results, a wife’s current annual earnings 
significantly lower both spouses’ reports of the husband’s decision-making power (with the 
impact on her husband’s and her own report shown in columns (1) and (2), respectively).  A 
husband’s earnings also significantly raise his wife’s report of his decision-making power.  
                                                 
18  We use two of three measures of cognition reported in the HRS.  The first, V5105, began, “Next, I' ll read a set of 
20 words and ask you to recall as many as you can.  We have purposely made the list long so that it will be difficult 
for anyone to recall all the words – most people recall just a few.”  We use the number that was answered correctly.  
We also used V5113, which adds together the number of fully or partially correct answers to a series of seven 
questions.  A third variable, V5126, had little explanatory power in our estimates.  For missing observations on 
cognition, we used hot-deck imputation with income and education as explanatory variables. 
19  This exceeds the raw correlation coefficient of 0.36.  We used univariate coefficient estimates as starting values, 
and they consistently yielded a higher log likelihood than did many alternatives that we tried.  Most parameter 
estimates, including those on earnings, were very similar across the univariate and bivariate specifications.  
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Interestingly, a wife’s earnings matter several times more than a husband’s in explaining both 
reports, while earnings of both spouses affect the wife’s report by about twice as much as the 
husband’s.
20 
We can also attribute pension income to each spouse.  Though the estimates are not 
statistically significant, each spouse’s pension income from earlier jobs and pension participation 
in a current job affect reported decision-making power with the same signs as earnings in almost 
all cases.  Once again a wife’s pension has a much greater effect than a husband’s. 
Earnings histories (Table 3-B).  The HRS provides restricted information about earnings 
histories reported by the Social Security Administration for 1951 to 1991.  We computed the 
average annualized present value of past annual earnings over this period and substituted it in 
place of current earnings on the right-hand side.  We have this data for 77% of the couples in our 
original estimation sample.
21 
We find that average past earnings in column (2) have a substantially greater impact on 
decision-making power than current earnings in (1) do.  The estimated effect of husbands’ 
earnings roughly doubles, though it is statistically insignificant, while the effect of wives’ 
earnings triples and is highly significant.  In column (3), we seek to distinguish the effect of 
current earnings and a measure of human capital, as indicated by average earnings over the ages 
of 22-45.  In this specification, wives’ current and average earnings affect her report, while 
wives’ current earnings affects his report. 
Other human capital variables (Table 3-A).  There are two ways that skill- and work-
related variables might affect decision-making power.  First, they may capture information about 
threat points that is not reflected in current earnings, in which case we should consider the effects 
of these variables alongside that of earnings.  Second, these variables may reflect other 
characteristics about the individual which are related to decision-making – for example, 
assertiveness, that is also associated with self-employment.  In that case, it would be important to 
control for them in order to isolate the effect of earnings.   
                                                 
20  If we limit the sample only to couples whose reports agree (which involves a different set of identifying 
assumptions, as we mentioned earlier), then the estimated earnings coefficients rise by about 1/3.  The biggest gains 
in parameter estimates occur in those categories – race, ethnicity, national origin – that cause the most disagreement. 
21  We do not have data for respondents who refused to provide their Social Security number or who provided a 
number that could not be matched.  We imputed earnings that were topcoded at the Social Security payroll tax limit.  
If we run the earlier specifications from Table 3-A on the limited sample from Table 3-B, the estimated effects of 
current earnings are very similar.  
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In fact, in later specifications that omit work-related variables, we find very little change 
in the earnings estimates, so neither possibility seems like a major concern.  In the specification 
in Table 3-A, we find that the effect of skill on bargaining power, as measured by occupation and 
education, is sometimes statistically significant and generally monotonic, raising own and 
reducing a spouse’s decision-making power.  The differential effect of being in the highest 
versus the lowest skilled occupation is similar in magnitude to the differential effect of having 
attended college versus not having completed high school. 
Being self-employed also has strong effects on one’s reported decision-making power.  If 
the husband is self-employed, it raises his reported power by over one-third more than the 
difference between low and high skill does.  It raises his wife’s report of his power, but by less.  
A wife’s self-employment reduces the husband’s power, but the effects are considerably smaller.  
Lastly, other human capital variables – cognition, health, parents’ education – have minor effects 
on bargaining power. 
Additional labor market variables (Table 3-C).  We explored additional specifications 
with different combinations of earnings and other work variables.  These estimates reinforce our 
results about the impact of earnings on bargaining power.   
By including controls for weekly hours of work in column (1), the coefficients on 
earnings can be thought of as isolating the effect of wages on decision-making power.
22  The 
estimated effects of a wife’s labor market activities are now split between hours of work and 
earnings (which represents wages, when controlling for hours), and both are statistically 
significant.  Finding an effect of hours of work indicates that wives may “exercise” their threat to 
some extent by working, which raises their decision-making power. 
As we mentioned earlier, it is difficult to know how to interpret the occupation and self-
employment variables in the main specification – they may help measure threat points or they 
may capture omitted characteristics correlated with decision-making power.  Thus, it is 
interesting to note that including simple work dummies in (2) instead of occupation and self-
employment had little effect on the earnings estimates.  If we, instead, exclude all other human 
capital and cultural variables and control only for work-related variables in (3), the estimated 
effects of earnings are a little smaller.  This reduces concerns that wives’ earnings are correlated 
with cultural variables in ways that undermines conclusions about the effect of earnings. 
                                                 
22  As we noted earlier, measuring the marginal wage accurately for this age group is difficult, as salaried jobs are 
the norm.  
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The last two specifications use transformations of the earnings variables, since we do not 
know exactly how earnings affect threat points.  Including the log instead of level of earnings in 
(4) yields estimated magnitudes of the effects of earnings that are similar.  The specification in 
(5) indicates that relative as well as absolute earnings influence threat points.  The ratio of 
earnings is now significant, while the level of earnings remains statistically significant for the 
wife’s reported power.  These results show that shifting a wife from having 25% to 75% of total 
earnings reduces husband’s reported bargaining power by as much as increasing the wife’s 
earnings by $25,000. 
 
B.  Understanding the estimated effect of earnings 
In this subsection, we discuss the magnitude of the estimated impact of earnings and 
other work variables.  First, in Table 4 we present estimates and standard errors (based on the 
delta method) of the true effects of all of the covariates on decision-making power, as well as the 
reporting bias induced by each covariates, based on our identifying assumption in (4). 
In Table 3-A, the estimated coefficient of wives’ current earnings/10,000 was -0.0356 
(0.0149) for husbands’ reports and -0.0753 (0.0149) for wives’ reports.  The resulting estimate of 
the true effect is the average, -0.0555 (0.0126), while the reporting bias is 0.0198 (0.0160) on 
husbands’ reports (and -0.0198 on wives’ reports).  Similarly, the true effect of wives’ average 
past earnings (at the bottom of Table 4) is -0.01756 (0.0337) and the reporting bias on husbands’ 
reports is 0.0650 (0.0570). 
Next, we analyze the magnitude of these estimated effects in Table 5.  We do this by 
simulating the effect on the distribution of decision-making power of altering husbands’ and 
wives’ earnings and work status.  We compare the results to a set of baseline predictions that use 
the estimated coefficients together with everyone’s actual earnings, and another set that assigns 
average earnings by gender to parallel the simulations.  Because the interpretation of the 
occupation and self-employment variables is ambiguous – it is unclear whether they reflect threat 
points or individual characteristics – we use similar estimates in which a simple work dummy 
substitutes for occupation and self-employment (as in column (2) of Table 3-C).
23 
For example, if we switch average current earnings of men and women, then the 
predicted percentage of husbands having the final say falls from 31.0 to 28.2%, according to 
                                                 
23  In Table 5 we use the estimated coefficients rather than the estimated “true effects”  to give a complete sense of 
the data that does not rely on our identification assumption.  If we used the estimated true effects, the predictions 
would lie approximately in the middle of those based on the husbands’ and on the wives’ answers.  
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husbands’ reports, and from 32.3 to 26.6%, according to wives’ reports.
24  If we do the same but 
switch average past earnings, then the declines are double in magnitude – from 31.5% to 19.7%, 
according to wives’ reports.  If we compare all husbands and no wives working to all wives and 
no husbands working (with the working spouse earning the conditional average by gender), then 
the percentage of husbands having the final say, as reported by wives, swings from 37.5% to 
27.3%, and the percentage of wives having the final say rises from 11.5% to 18.0%.  
Overall, we characterize these effects as moderate.  They show a clear, but not large, 
effect of earnings on bargaining power that should be kept in mind when considering tests of 
income pooling that are common in the literature.  Moreover, further research may shed light on 
the extent to which bargaining in the HRS cohort may differ from later cohorts that have 
experienced major changes in divorce rates, fertility, women’s labor supply and earnings, etc. 
 
C.  The impact of other control variables 
We included a large set of variables reflecting ethnic and cultural background.  
Coefficient estimates appear in Table 3-A, and the decomposition into true effects and reporting 
bias appear in Table 4.  Some of these have significant effects on bargaining power, which is 
interesting for three reasons.  First, these background factors may be correlated with the labor 
supply of each spouse.  Second, cultural factors may affect threat points.  For example, cultural 
norms may influence the willingness of a spouse to consider divorce by reducing utility outside 
of marriage.  Alternatively, they may reflect the degree to which the community favors one 
spouse over the other in the event of conflict.  Third, some of the background variables lead to 
considerable disagreement between the spouses’ reports about decision-making power. 
Race, national origin, and ethnicity have some significant effects on reported decision-
making power in Table 3-A in roughly descending order in terms of magnitude, although the 
significance of the true effects is reduced in Table 4.  If both spouses are black, it has little net 
effect on the husband’s report of decision-making power, while reducing the wife’s report of the 
husband’s power.  Similar results, though somewhat smaller are found for foreign born 
couples.
25 
Religion also has strong effects on reported decision-making power, and with much less 
disagreement.  In Protestant and especially fundamentalist or evangelical Protestant couples 
                                                 
24  Average earnings of husbands and wives in our sample are $38,348 and $11,897, including nonworkers. 
25  As these variables generate considerable disagreement, we find substantial increases in their coefficient estimates 
if we limit the sample only to couples whose reports agree.  
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husbands have significantly more decision-making power.  In Catholic and non-religious couples 
the effects are the reverse, though smaller, while couples reporting different religions have a 
significant disagreement.
26  Moreover, regular church attendance by either spouse significantly 
raises husbands’ decision-making power. 
It is interesting to find that having kids, especially if they are under the age of 18, reduces 
a husband’s reported bargaining power considerably.
27  While it has much less influence on 
wives’ reports in the main specification, both effects are greater in specification 3-B (2) with 
average past, rather than current, earnings.  The true effect of having children under the age of 18 
in this specification is negative and statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. 
In addition, increased age of both spouses (or else cohort effects) reduces a husband’s 
reported bargaining power a little.  Lastly, we find little effect of controls for information about 
individuals’ time horizon and risk preferences, which we include because they shape some of the 
household decisions which we investigate later. 
 
VI.  WHAT DOES BARGAINING POWER INFLUENCE? 
In this section, we demonstrate that decision-making power influences important 
household decisions.  As examples, we focus on two financial outcomes that are well-measured 
in the HRS:  total wealth accumulation and stock market investment.  Both sets of estimated 
effects are important in magnitude, though somewhat sensitive to the specification. 
Our findings about wealth accumulation diverge in an interesting way from standard life 
cycle predictions:  household assets rise with the husband’s age when husbands are in charge and 
with the wife’s age when wives are in charge.  Thus, it appears that the spouse with the final say 
may be making decisions based primarily on their own life-cycle prospects.  We show that this 
difference is only partly explained by our other main result:  when husbands are in charge, the 
household take on more risk by investing more of the household portfolio in equities.  While we 
do not elaborate on underlying life cycle models that may be associated with these patterns, they 
suggest important directions for future research. 
 
 
                                                 
26  We define religious differences based on these broad categories, which are aggregated over many denominations. 
27  In theory, kids might shift bargaining power in either direction (increasing the wife’s power if she has 
disproportionate influence over kids’ emotional well-being or increasing the husband’s if he has disproportionate 
influence over their material well-being).  We cannot explain why perceptions about the impact of kids might differ 
across spouses.  
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A.  Estimation approach 
We use three methods to estimate the impact of bargaining power.  We maintain the 
assumption throughout that total earnings in the household may be related to these financial 
outcomes, but the split between spouses’ earnings is not, except through its influence on 
bargaining power.
28  As we noted earlier, this is necessary in the structural models because we do 
not observe continuously measured bargaining power but instead use variables that influence 
bargaining power to, in effect, impute a continuous measure.
29  Besides that, we include all non-
income related control variables used earlier to explain decision-making power, and we add self-
reported information on each spouse’s life expectancy, which influences their time horizons. 
The first two methods that we use yield structural estimates of equation (6), relating the 
impact of decision-making power g  to an outcome z.  We will highlight the more efficient 
approach, described in the Appendix and based on Amemiya (1979), which uses reduced form 
and first-stage estimates to obtain the structural parameters of the second stage.  We compare 
that to a standard two-stage approach that substitutes into (6) an estimate of g ˆ  obtained from our 
earlier specifications.  Here, we can control for the log rather than level of total household 
earnings, but the estimates are less efficient and have incorrect standard errors.  Controlling for 
the log of income is preferred on a priori grounds (especially when utility is CRRA) and is 
typical in regressions involving financial behavior.  Typically, the estimated effect of decision-
making power loses some explanatory power under the efficient estimation approach but remains 
statistically significant. 
With either structural method, the results are somewhat sensitive to the choice of which 
first-stage estimates to use.  We try the specifications with current earnings (from Table 3-A), 
average past earnings (Table 3-B 2, for a smaller sample), and the ratio of earnings (Table 3-C 
5).  When we use the last specification, we can control for the log rather than level of total 
household earnings in the first estimation approach for reasons that are detailed in the Appendix.   
                                                 
28  While earnings and other work-related variables may be endogenous, they are typically included in financial 
regressions and play a major role in explaining the observed variation (Miniaci and Weber 2002).  One motivation is 
that, while wealth and portfolio allocations vary substantially by income, they also vary substantially within income 
groups, and it is this variation that the other control variables seek to explain.  This approach also addresses concerns 
that omitting earnings might bias the estimated effect of predicted bargaining power.  In any case, excluding income 
and work-related variables typically has little impact on the estimated effect of bargaining power. 
29  We were interested in analyzing life insurance holdings as well because of the potential link between bargaining 
power during marriage and the poverty of widows, but the exclusion restriction was unreasonable in that case since 
the decision to insure a spouse’s life should depend directly on that spouse’s earnings.  Another difficulty is that the 
HRS does not report whose life is insured, but rather which spouse owns the policies.  
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Lastly, we find similar effects of decision-making power in our third approach, which is a 
non-structural alternative to (6) that controls for the discrete answers about decision-making 
power.  This approach does not rely on the functional form represented by (1)-(2b) that we 
assumed in the first stage, but it revives the original difficulty of extracting information from the 
discrete and sometimes conflicting answers of spouses.  On the other hand, it allows us to control 
for the log rather than level of household earnings and even to include spouses’ earnings 
separately, which has little effect on the estimated results. 
   
B.  Wealth and age 
Background.  As long as households expect to retire at some point, then life cycle 
models predict that wealth will rise with age until retirement.  Moreover, households appear to 
do most of their life cycle saving in their 40s and 50s (Gourinchas and Parker 2002), which 
coincides well with the HRS.  However, bargaining within the household may be particularly 
salient here since husbands, with shorter lifespans and younger wives on average, should have 
shorter time horizons than their wives (Browning 2000).  Wives should prefer to accumulate 
more life cycle saving than husbands, yet widows have higher poverty rates than the population 
average. 
Our results about the role of bargaining power can help resolve this puzzle.  We find that, 
when men are in charge, households with older husbands have significantly higher wealth and 
households with older wives have significantly lower wealth; and when wives are in charge, the 
results are reversed.  Thus, it appears that the spouse with the final say makes decisions based on 
their own life-cycle prospects. 
We regressed log household wealth on decision-making power and interacted it with each 
spouse’s age, and also included total household earnings, other controls used in our earlier 
regressions, and the subjective life expectancy of each spouse.  We show a small subset of 
coefficient estimates in Table 6, the key ones being the interaction of decision-making power 
with each spouse’s age.  The top panel shows the efficient estimation approach, the middle panel 
shows the standard two-stage approach, and the bottom panel shows the non-structural approach 
with the raw answers on decision-making power. 
It is worth noting at the outset that the coefficients estimated for the main age effects are 
quite similar in size to those estimated for the decision-making/age interactions.  The age  
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coefficients generally range between 0.02 and 0.04, indicating an annual percentage increase in 
wealth of 2-4% as each spouse ages. 
The additional impact on wealth of the decision-making/age interactions depends on the 
magnitude of the decision-making power variable.  For this purpose, consider the estimated 
threshold values 0 m ˆ  and  1 m ˆ  reported in Table 3-A.  They indicate the values at which the latent 
continuous variable g is predicted to shift, first, from the wife having the final say to power being 
about equal and, next, from being about equal to the husband having the final say.  The estimated 
difference between these values – typically about 1.7 – crosses the full range over which 
decision-making power is “about equal”, and we will use that to gauge the magnitude of the 
effects in which we are interested. 
Two-stage estimation.  As a baseline, the middle panel of Table 6 reports the two-stage 
estimates from each of three different first-stage specifications, with incorrect standard errors but 
with the log rather than level of household earnings as a covariate.  The estimated effects of 
decision-making power when it is interacted with each spouse’s age is stable across the three sets 
of results, taking values around 0.045 for the husband’s age and -0.040 for the wife’s age. 
Efficient estimation.  When we use the efficient estimation approach in the top panel, the 
bargaining power-age interaction effects are smaller.  We will focus on the specification with the 
first-stage estimates that use the ratio of earnings, which worked well in Table 3-C 5 and allows 
us to control for the log of earnings; and we focus on the log of average past earnings, since it 
explains more of the variation in wealth than do current earnings.  The resulting pair of estimated 
coefficients on the bargaining power-age interaction lies in the middle of the range in this set of 
results, at 0.0253 for the husbands’ age and -0.0319 for the wife’s age.  The first coefficient falls 
just short of 90% significance and the second coefficient exceeds 95% significance. 
Now, we will consider the implications of these estimates.  Recall that if decision-making 
power shifts from the threshold of the wife to the husband having the final say, then the latent 
continuous variable g changes by about 1.7.  If such a shift occurs, then household wealth will be 
4.20% higher (the estimated coefficient 0.0253 times the estimated difference in threshold values 
1.6593) than it would have been otherwise for each year that the husband is older.  Additionally, 
with such a shift in decision-making power towards the husband, wealth is 5.29% lower  
(-0.0319*1.6593) for each year that the wife is older.  If the reverse takes place, with the 
household shifting from the threshold of the husband to the wife having the final say, then the  
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effects are reversed:  wealth is 5.29% higher for each year that the wife is older and 4.20% lower 
for each year that the husband is older. 
To understand the nature of this cross-sectional comparative static, consider a household 
in which decision-making power is split equally (taking a value of zero).  Wealth will be about 
the same whether the husband is 65 and the wife is 55, or the ages are reversed and the wife is 65 
and the husband is 55.  That does not hold when decision-making power is unequal.  When the 
husband just barely has the final say, then the first household (husband 65, wife 55) will have 
accumulated 50.8% more wealth (1.0420
10-1) than it would have if the wife just barely had the 
final say.  Moreover, the second household (wife 65, husband 55) will have accumulated 67.5% 
less wealth (1.0529
10-1) than if the wife had the final say. 
Non-structural estimation.  Table 6 also shows alternative estimates that include the raw 
responses about decision-making power as dummy variables.  The age-related patterns are 
similar, while highlighting the difficulties in interpretation of moving away from the framework 
laid out in Section III. 
When husbands report that they have the final say, household wealth is 4.07% higher for 
each year that the husband is older and 3.00% lower for each year that the wife is older, 
compared to when husbands report that wives have the final say.  These results are statistically 
significant.  When husbands report “about equal”, the results are significantly smaller, at 3.18% 
higher and 1.39% lower, respectively, and the first result is statistically significant.  The values 
are similar when we use wives’ instead of husbands’ reports.  Lastly, in estimates that are not 
shown, we do not reject equality of the coefficients on each spouse’s earnings included 
separately, and doing so has little effect on the other results. 
 
C.  The riskiness of the household portfolio. 
   Background.  Men in the HRS report somewhat greater risk tolerance than women 
(Barsky et al 1997).  Moreover, other research suggests that men are willing to take on more risk, 
with single men investing a greater share of their wealth in the stock market than single women 
(Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1996), men purchasing auto insurance policies that provide less 
coverage (Cohen and Einav 2004) and men even taking more risks in mundane choices involving 
seat belt use and preventative dental care (Hersch 1996). 
Results in Table 7 reveal the impact of these apparent differences in risk preferences on 
some important household decisions.  We find that, as husbands’ power rises, households invest  
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more in the stock market, and this effect is significant in many of the specifications.  We 
estimated probits on whether households invest in the stock market at all (which 32% in our 
sample do) and tobits on the share of financial assets invested in the stock market (which is 17% 
on average).
30  As in the previous section, we controlled for total household earnings, other 
controls used in our earlier regressions, and subjective life expectancy.  The coefficient of 
interest is the one on the decision-making power and “final say” variables. 
Two-stage estimation.  As a baseline, the middle panel of Table 7 reports estimates from 
the two-stage approach with incorrect standard errors, but with the log rather than level of 
household earnings as a control.  When we use the current earnings specification from 3-A in the 
first stage, the marginal effect of the husband’s predicted bargaining power on stock market 
participation in the probit is 0.1811, and the effect on the desired share of financial assets 
invested in the stock market in the tobit is 0.2755.  The estimated effects are reduced by about 
one-third when we use the average past earnings specification from 3-B 2 in the first-stage and 
increased by about one-third when we use the ratio of earnings specification from 3-C 5, whether 
controlling for the log of current or average past earnings. 
Efficient estimation.  When we use the efficient estimation approach in the top panel, the 
estimated effect is smaller for the specifications that control for current earnings (3-A and the 
first 3-C 5 result) and considerably larger for the specifications that control for average past 
earnings (3-B 2 and the second 3-C 5 result).  Since it is preferable, once again, to control for the 
log of average past earnings, we will focus on the last specification – though it should be kept in 
mind that the resulting estimates lie at the high end of the range. 
In the preferred specification, the estimated marginal effect of a small change in decision-
making power is 0.4262 for the probit, and the estimated coefficient is 0.6874 for the tobit, both 
of which are highly significant.  If decision-making power in a household shifts, as before, from 
the threshold of the wife having the final say to the husband having the final say, then the 
probability that the household invests in the stock market rises by a very substantial 50.9 
percentage points.  The same shift in decision-making power raises the predicted share of 
                                                 
30  A caveat is that the HRS does not report the investment allocation of Individual Retirement Accounts or of those 
defined contribution pensions (including 401(k) plans) that do not offer an investment choice.  45% of our sample 
have IRAs, which we omit entirely from the analysis.  35% have defined contribution pensions, 60% of which can 
be identified as offering investment choices; for the latter, the HRS reports whether the account was invested mostly 
in stocks, mostly in bonds, or “split”.  This information is vague, though, and we chose to focus entirely on financial 
wealth and did not consider any form pension wealth.  These omissions may lead us to underestimate the effect of  
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financial assets invested in the stock market by 26.0 percentage points.
31  By way of comparison, 
the estimates for the same first-stage specification but controlling for log current earnings are 
considerably smaller, at 0.2002 for the probit (statistically significant at a little more than 90%) 
and 0.3182 for the tobit (statistically significant at a little less than 90%).  These estimates imply 
predicted increases of 29.3 and 13.7 percentage points if decision-making power shifts from the 
wife to the husband. 
Non-structural estimation.  In the final panel of Table 6, the results are similar when the 
raw answers are included as dummy variables.  If the husband reports having the final say, then 
the household is 5.1% more likely to invest in the stock market relative to the wife having the 
final say and a little greater than that relative to “about equal”.  The effects are somewhat 
reduced and not statistically significant based on the wife’s reports.  As we noted earlier, this 
specification raises difficulties in reconciling the discrete and sometimes conflicting answers of 
both spouses. 
Lastly, we find some suggestive evidence that other preferences of the individual in 
charge matter more as well.  In results that are not shown, when husbands have the final say, 
then  the household invests more in the stock market if the husband is less risk averse, while 
wives’ risk aversion has no affect.  When wives are in charge, wives’ risk aversion has 
substantial effects, though they are not statistically significant.  We find similar patterns for time 
preference. 
Summary.  Taking our two major sets of results together, we note that the difference in 
portfolio allocations can explain part but not all of the age-related results.  In the benchmark 
calculation discussed above, a shift from the threshold of the wife to the husband having the final 
say would raise the predicted share of financial assets invested in the stock market by 26.0 
percentage points.  According to some simple calculations, this could raise wealth at age 65 by 
36.1%.
32  Since our earlier benchmark suggested that the same household would accumulate 
                                                                                                                                                             
bargaining power.  For people in our sample whose pensions offer an investment choice, men are significantly more 
likely than women to invest theirs “mostly or all” in stock. 
31  For the probit, we calculated this as  ) ˆ X ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ X ˆ ˆ ( d m g F d m g F + - + 0 1 , where notation is based on equations (6) 
and (10) and  j m  refers to the j
th threshold in the first-stage ordered probit.  For the tobit, we calculated the change in 
the expected censored value of the left-hand side variable using the formula from Greene (2000). 
32  In these calculations, we assume that bonds and stocks earn real returns of 2.25% and 7.10%, the respective 
averages for the period 1926-2004.  We further assume that people have the lifetime age-earnings profile of the 
median HRS individual, excluding those with non-zero earnings; that they save a constant fraction of their salary 
each year from age 22 until they retire at age 65; and that they rebalance their portfolio annually.  
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50.8% more if the husband had the final say and 67.5% less wealth if the wife had the final say 
(both in comparison to decision-making power being exactly equal), the difference in portfolio 
choices explains only a fraction of the difference in wealth. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis takes advantage of unique data on the distribution of decision-making power 
between spouses.  We interpret this question as revealing whose preferences are reflected to a 
greater degree in household decisions. We find that decision-making power depends on plausible 
variables like earnings and also influences some important household outcomes.  Moreover, the 
second set of results is much stronger than the first set.   
In terms of outcomes of bargaining, we find that, household wealth is significantly higher 
the older is the husband but not the wife when husbands have the final say, and the older is the 
wife but not the husband when wives have the final say – an intriguing twist on the life cycle 
model.  We find further that, when husbands have the final say, households invest significantly 
more in the stock market, though the difference in portfolio allocations can explain only part of 
the age-related results.  Being able to investigate outcomes that are both novel in the household 
bargaining literature and important is a major contribution of our research. 
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that household bargaining can help explain 
the relatively high rate of poverty among widows.  These concerns provide support for proposals 
to increase Social Security survivor benefits, especially in case of Social Security privatization.  
A shift away from the current annuitized Social Security benefit towards a lump-sum private 
account would increase the risk of impoverishment among older widows who were in a weak 
bargaining position while married.  Likewise, the major shift over the last twenty years in the 
structure of employer-provided pensions from annuitized defined benefits towards lump-sum 
defined contribution accounts may undermine the well-being of widows. 
In terms of determinants of bargaining power, our major result in this paper is somewhat 
negative, since we remain unable to explain a great deal about the observed distribution of 
bargaining power.  Labor market earnings have significant but moderate effects in our estimation 
results for this older sample – switching average lifetime earnings of husbands and wives reduces 
the predicted percentage of men reported to have the final say by their wives from 31.5% to 
19.7%.  These results are noteworthy because the HRS affords much more detail about the entire  
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path of earnings than data used in previous “income pooling” tests, yet earnings appear to play a 
limited role in determining threat points. 
Thus, future research may focus greater attention on other factors influencing threat 
points, perhaps including the role of marriage markets since remarriage has become common as 
divorce rates have risen over time.  In addition, it should be possible to extend this research by 
estimating formal models of bargaining with the HRS data and by exploiting the entry in 
subsequent waves of the HRS of younger cohorts who were asked the same questions about who 






We now describe the method that we use to estimate the parameters in (6) when we observe 
discrete measures y and possibly z rather than the true values y* and z*.  This approach is based 
on Amemiya (1979) and was elaborated by Maddala (1983, Section 8.9).  Although focusing on 
the simultaneous tobit model, Amemiya (p.175) noted that, “The principles on which our 
estimators are based can be applied in general whenever structural parameters need to be 
determined from the estimates of reduced-form parameters.” 
 
While we continue to assume the relationship outlined in (1), (2a), (2b), and (6), the details of 
separately identifying the parameters a, bh, and bw in (1)-(2b) are not germane to the estimation 
procedure, so we will introduce some simplifications.  We will first discuss a simple version and 
then show how we incorporate the sum of earnings as a covariate in (6) when also including 
earnings separately in the first stage. 
 
Consider the following structural model:  
 
(A.1a)  1 1 1 1 u X X              y
* + + = d a  
(A.1b)  2 2 2 2 u X X y z
* * + + + = d a g . 
 
Equation (A.1a) is the analog to (1), except with a1 and d1 representing  1 a  and  1 d  as defined in 
(5a), while (A.1b) is the analog to (6).  X1  are variables that only appear in the first equation (or, 
as we call it sometimes, the first stage), X2 are variables that only appear in the second equation, 
and X  are variables that appear in both.  The parameter g  is a scalar, and a1, a2, d1, and d2 may 
be scalars or vectors.  Substitute (A.1a) into (A.1b) to obtain 
 
    ( ) 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 u u X X X z
* + + + + + = g d gd a a g  . 
 
We can now write the reduced form of the structural equation (A.1b) as  
 
 (A.2)  e X X X z
* + + + = 3 2 2 1 1 p p p . 
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We can estimate (A.1a) to obtain consistent estimates of  1 a ˆ  and  1 d ˆ  and (A.2) to obtain consistent 
estimates of  1 p ˆ ,  2 p ˆ ,  3 p ˆ , and the covariance matrix  e ˆ W .  Note that 
* y  and 
* z  may be either 
continuous or discrete; in our case, (A.1a) is an ordered probit and (A.2) takes the form of, 
variously, probit, tobit, and OLS. 
 
The relationship between the structural and reduced form parameters is     
   (A.3a)   1 1 ga p =  
  (A.3b)   2 2 a p =  
  (A.3c)   2 1 3 d gd p + = . 
 
(A.3b) identifies the structural parameters a2.  In regards to the rest, Amemiya proposes using 
the consistent estimates of  1 p ˆ ,  3 p ˆ ,  1 a ˆ , and  1 d ˆ  in order to estimate g ˆ  and  2 d ˆ   by generalized 
least squares (GLS), with  e ˆ W  as the weighting matrix.  He shows that this approach is more 
efficient than the two-stage estimator proposed by Nelson and Olsen (1977) and elaborated by 
Maddala (1983, Section 8.8). 
 
Now, we will discuss how to incorporate the sum of household earnings as a covariate in (A.1b) 
when each spouse’s earnings are covariates in (A.1a).  We will rewrite the equations as 
 








1 u X X X X              y
o o * + + + + = d a a a  




1 u X X ) X X ( y z
* * + + + + + = d a d g . 
 
We have now decomposed X1 into 
1
1 X  and 
2
1 X  (which will represent the husband’s and the 
wife’s earnings) and 





1 X X +  (total household earnings) now appears in the second equation.  Once again, 
we can substitute to obtain 
 








1 u u X X X ) ( X ) ( X z
o o * + + + + + + + + + = g d gd a a g d ga d ga  
and then write the reduced form of the structural equation (A.1b¢) as  
 
 (A.2¢)  e X X X X X z








1 p p p p p . 
 
The relationship between the structural and reduced form parameters is now     




1 d ga p + =  




1 d ga p + =  
  (A.4c)  
o o
1 1 ga p =  
  (A.4d)   2 2 a p =  
  (A.4e)   2 1 3 d gd p + = . 
 
We can proceed in the same way as before.  We estimate (A.1a¢) to obtain 
1
1 a ˆ , 
2
1 a ˆ , and 
o ˆ 1 a .  We 
estimate (A.2¢) to obtain 
1
1 p ˆ , 
2
1 p ˆ , 
o ˆ 1 p ,  2 p ˆ ,  3 p ˆ , and  e ˆ W .  Lastly, we estimate the system (A.4a), 
(A.4b), (A.4c), and (A.4e) using GLS to obtain the remaining structural parameters in (A.1b¢). 
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To sum up, we use the methods that we outlined earlier in the Appendix to estimate the 
parameters reported in Table 7, with (A.1b) taking the form of a probit or tobit.  We estimate a 
yet more generalized version of (A.1b¢) for Table 6, adding additional terms that interact y* with 
elements of X – specifically, the husband’s age and wife’s age.  As a consequence of these 
interactions, (A.2¢) involves terms that interact age with the error term e, so we use the Huber-
White method to estimate the covariance matrix  e ˆ W . 
 
For the results in both tables, we also try different specifications of the first-stage equation 
(A.1a).  When we use specifications that include each spouse’s current or average past earnings 
in the first stage, then we include the sum of earnings in the second stage.  While we would 
prefer the log of the sum of earnings, including this non-linear transformation of first-stage 
covariates is not possible using the method we have outlined above.  As an alternative, we 
consider a first-stage specification of (A.1a) with the ratio of spouses’ earnings, and then we can 
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of decision making power in the HRS sample 
         
         
  “When it comes to making major family decisions, who has the final say?” 
     
  Husband reports … has more say:   
  husband  about equal  wife  Total [N] 
Wife reports …         
    husband       18.1%        11.5           2.3    31.9 [1350] 
    about equal         8.8        40.1           3.9    52.8 [2235] 
    wife         3.3          6.5           5.5    15.3   [652] 
         
Total [N]     30.2 [1278]     58.1 [2460]       11.7 [499]   100% [4237] 
         
         
  “Does … have a lot more say, somewhat more, or only a little more?” 
     
  Husband reports … has … say:   
  husband 










/ a little 
more 




Wife reports …             
    husband – a lot more    2.3    3.3    2.4    0.3    0.3    8.6 
    husband – somewhat/  
       a little more 
  2.0  10.4    9.0    1.1    0.5  23.0 
    about equal    1.7    7.1  40.2    2.8    1.1  52.9 
    wife – somewhat/  
       a little more 
  0.3    1.9    3.9    2.0    0.8    8.9 
    wife – a lot more    0.3    0.9    2.7    1.5    1.2    6.6 
             
Total    6.6  23.6  58.2    7.7    3.9  100% 
         
         
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, Wave 1, 1992. 
Sample:  N = 4237.  See text for more details.  
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TABLE 2 
Characteristics of the sample, based on who has more say 
         
         
  Who has more say? 
  Husband  Wife  About 
equal 
Disagree 
Income, work variables:         
  both spouses work  42.1  39.4  46.4  43.9 
  only husband works  29.1  22.0  24.6  25.7 
  only wife works    9.1  22.0  13.3  15.4 
  neither spouse works  19.7  16.6  15.9  15.0 
  husband’s weekly hours  44.0  44.0  44.2  45.0 
  wife’s weekly hours  34.2  39.4  37.3  36.8 
  husband’s earnings    31,100  25,000    32,000    30,000 
  wife’s earnings    12,000  19,000    17,000    15,000 
         
Other variables:         
  income    45,700  41,216    49,200    46,360 
  net worth  121,700  65,700  132,000  117,500 








  % of financial assets invested in  
    equity (median/mean) 
0.0/17.9  0.0/10.4  0.0/18.3  0.0/17.2 
         
         
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, Wave 1, 1992. 
Sample:  N = 4237.  See text for more details.  
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TABLE 3-A 
Determinants of decision making power 
Estimation results from bivariate ordered probits 
         
  Dependent variable:  Respondent reports husband has final say (Yi = 1), 
it’s about equal (Yi = 0), wife has final say (Yi = -1) 
     
  Husband is respondent  Wife is respondent 
       
Log likelihood (LL/N)  - 1.801 
Rho  0.4545
***  (0.0257) 
Threshold value m0     -1.2745
***    (0.1864)     -1.1504
***  (0.1929) 
Threshold value m1      0.4921
***    (0.1887)      0.3966
**    (0.1924) 
Income variables     
 husband’s earnings/10,000       0.0072      (0.0053)       0.0150
***  (0.0054) 
 wife’s earnings/10,000      -0.0356
**   (0.0149)      -0.0753
***  (0.0149) 
 husband’s pension income/10,000       0.0360      (0.0312)       0.0435      (0.0289) 
 wife’s pension income/10,000      -0.1072      (0.1118)      -0.1212      (0.0986) 
 husband has pension in current job       0.0123      (0.0511)       0.0196      (0.0518) 
 wife has pension in current job      -0.0595      (0.0526)       0.0365      (0.0538) 
     
  Characteristics of:  Characteristics of: 
Other work variables  husband  wife  husband  wife 




































































Human capital variables         
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Cultural background variables         


































 religion: attend church ³ twice/mth   0.0804
* 
(0.0454) 









       both are Protestant         0.2295
*** (0.0740)         0.2060
*** (0.0807) 
       both are Evangelical         0.3746
**  (0.1535)         0.5177
*** (0.1583) 
       both are Catholic        -0.1126
**  (0.0499)        -0.1722
*** (0.0501) 
       both are Jewish         0.1874     (0.1331)        -0.0454     (0.1353) 
       both report no religion        -0.2177  
   (0.1746)        -0.0974     (0.1634) 
       religion differs         0.0515     (0.0487)        -0.1220
***  (0.0500) 
Other variables         





















 age-50  -0.0079
**   
(0.0040) 
-0.0081
**   
(0.0039) 
-0.0013      
(0.0042) 
-0.0015      
(0.0041) 
 has kids:  over age 18 only        -0.1109     (0.1033)        -0.0010     (0.1035) 
     age 18 & under only        -0.2466     (0.1601)        -0.1616     (0.1615) 
     over and under age 18        -0.1878
*    (0.1131)         0.0548     (0.1133) 
         
         
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, 1992. 
Sample:  N = 4237.  Statistical significant at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) level is noted.  See text for 
more details. 
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TABLE 3-B 
Determinants of decision making power 
Variations on specification of earnings variable 
         
  Dependent variable:  Respondent reports husband has final say (Yi = 1), 
it’s about equal (Yi = 0), wife has final say (Yi = -1) 
         
  (1) current earnings 
(from Table 3-A) 
(2) average past 
earnings 
(3) current, average 
past earnings 
       
Log likelihood/N  -1.801  -1.790  -1.792 
   
  Husband is respondent 
Threshold value m0   -1.2745 (0.1864)   -1.1133 (0.2230)   -1.1515 (0.2242) 
Threshold value m1    0.4921  (0.1887)    0.6658 (0.2255)    0.6218  (0.2264) 
Earnings variables       
current earnings/10,000       
    husband   0.0072    (0.0053)  -   0.0053    (0.0065) 
    wife  -0.0356
** (0.0149)  -  -0.0301
*  (0.0178) 
       
average past earnings/10,000    1951-1991  age 22-45 
    husband  -    0.0114    (0.0244)  -0.0011   (0.0297) 
    wife  -  -0.1106
***
 (0.0440)  -0.0173   (0.0318) 
       
  Wife is respondent 
Threshold value m0   -1.1504 (0.1929)   -1.1235 (0.2345)   -1.0600   (02443) 
Threshold value m1    0.3966 (0.1924)    0.4428 (0.2345)     0.5245  (0.2458) 
Earnings variables       
current earnings/10,000       
    husband   0.0150
***(0.0054)  -   0.0098     (0.0064) 
    wife  -0.0753
***(0.0149)  -  -0.0678
*** (0.0181) 
       
average past earnings/10,000    1951-1991  age 22-45 
    husband  -   0.0200     (0.0247)  -0.0048     (0.0305) 
    wife  -  -0.2405
*** (0.0442)  -0.0797
*** (0.0312) 
       
       
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, Wave 1, 1992. 
Sample:  N = 3087 in columns (2), (3).  All specifications include on the right-hand side all of the other variables 
shown in Table 3-A.  See text for more details. 
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TABLE 3-C:  Determinants of decision making power 
Variations on specification of work variables 
         
  Dependent variable:  Respondent reports husband has final say (Yi = 1), it’s 
about equal (Yi = 0), wife has final say (Yi = -1) 
           
  (1) weekly 







(4) log of 
earnings 
(5) ratio of 
earnings 
Log likelihood (LL/N)  -1.799    -1.810  -1.830  -1.803  -1.799 
Selected work variables  Husband is respondent 









  0.0036     
 (0.0058) 
 wife’s earnings/10,000  -0.0256
*   
(0.0153) 
-0.0364






***   
(0.0063) 
 -0.0133  
 (0.0169) 
     wife’s earnings     . 
husband’s+wife’s earnings 
-  -  -  -  -0.2402
*** 
  (0.0923) 
  husband’s+wife’s 
       earnings = 0 
-  -  -  -    0.0358    
 (0.0776) 
  husband works  -  0.1388
***  
(0.0498) 
-  -  - 
  wife works  -  -0.0365  
 (0.0461) 
-  -  - 
 husband’s weekly hours  -0.0007     
 (0.0014) 
-  -  -  - 
  wife’s weekly hours   -0.0042
***     
(0.0016) 
-  -  -  - 
  Wife is respondent 









  0.0117    
 (0.0058) 
  wife’s earnings    -0.0613
*   
(0.0155) 
-0.0762











      wife’s earnings     . 
husband’s+wife’s earnings 
-  -  -  -   -0.2412
*** 
 (0.0945) 
  husband’s+wife’s 
       earnings = 0 
-  -  -  -    0.0450    
 (0.0785) 
  husband works  -  -0.0455  
(0.0515) 
-  -  - 
  wife works  -  -0.0299     
(0.0476) 
-  -  - 
 husband’s weekly hours  0.0001  
(0.0015) 
-  -  -  - 
  wife’s weekly hours    -0.0065
***     
(0.0018) 
-  -  -  - 
Also includes:occ,self-empl  yes  no  yes  yes  yes 
   other control variables  yes  yes  no  yes  yes 
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, Wave 1, 1992.  Sample:  N = 4237.  Except as noted, all specifications include on 
the right-hand side all of the other variables shown in Table 3-A.  See text for more details.  




Decomposition of estimated determinants of decision making power 
Estimation results from Table 3-A 
         
  Dependent variable:  Respondent reports husband has final say (Yi = 1), 
it’s about equal (Yi = 0), wife has final say (Yi = -1) 
     
  True effect  Husband’s reporting bias 
Income variables  Current earnings specification 
 husband’s earnings/10,000    0.0111
***  (0.0044)  -0.0039     (0.0060) 
 wife’s earnings/10,000  -0.0555
***  (0.0126)    0.0198
      (0.0160) 
 husband’s pension income/10,000    0.0397
      (0.0246)  -0.0038     (0.0345) 
 wife’s pension income/10,000   -0.1142      (0.0866)    0.0070     (0.1201) 
 husband has pension in current job    0.0160     (0.0430)  -0.0037     (0.0565) 
 wife has pension in current job  -0.0115     (0.0447)  -0.0480     (0.0577) 
     
  Characteristics of husband:  Characteristics of wife: 
Other work variables  True  Bias  True  Bias 
 occupation:  professional, technical     0.1196
**   0.0156  -0.0667   0.0026 
     sales, clerical  0.0532   0.0466   0.0039  -0.0267 
     services  -0.0465   0.0756  -0.0484   0.0243 
     skilled blue collar      -0.1158
**   0.0176   0.0648     0.1096
** 
     unskilled blue collar    -0.1302
**   0.0217  -0.0096    0.0644 
 self-employed     0.2788
***   0.0654  -0.0789  -0.0364 
Human capital:  cognition score #1   0.0076   -0.0044  -0.0051   0.0026 
     score #2   0.0087   0.0072
  -0.0049  -0.0066 
 education:  no high school diploma    -0.1497
***  -0.0032     0.1057
***  -0.0317 
     at least some college   0.0440   0.0366  -0.0676
*  -0.0104 
 health is fair or poor   0.0157  -0.0071  -0.0015  -0.0182 
 both parents:  no high sch diploma    0.0144  -0.0258   0.0207  -0.0087 
     at least some college   -0.1163  -0.0483  -0.1259
*  -0.0195 
Cultural:  born outside U.S.    0.1027    0.0869
    -0.1656
***  -0.0631 
 race:  black    0.2576   0.2172  -0.3554
*  -0.0378 
 ethnicity:  hispanic   0.0280   0.0797   0.1151   0.0466 
 religion:  attend church ³ twice/mth    0.0839
**  -0.0034    0.0724
*   0.0195 
       both are Protestant       0.2178
***    0.0117 
       both are Evang’l/Fundamentalist     0.4462
**   -0.0716 
       both are Catholic     -0.1424
***    0.0298 
       both are Jewish   0.0710    0.1164
 
       both report no religion  -0.1576  -0.0601 
       religion differs  -0.0353     0.0868
* 
Other variables:  risk averse   0.0090   0.0189  0.0002  0.0012 
 long time horizon  -0.0202  -0.0045  0.0358  -0.0053 
 age-50  -0.0046  -0.0033  -0.0049  -0.0033 
 has kids:  over age 18 only  -0.0560  -0.0549 
     age 18 & under only  -0.2041  -0.0425 
     over and under age 18  -0.0665  -0.1213  
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Selected results  Average past earnings specification 3-B(2) 
 husband’s earnings/10,000        0.0157     (0.0205)       -0.0043     (0.0270) 
 wife’s earnings/10,000       -0.1756
*** (0.0370)        0.0650     (0.0479) 
         
         
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, Wave 1, 1992. 





Simulations of predicted decision making power 
  Husband reports … has more say  Wife reports … has more say 












     
  Based on specifications that control for current earnings, 
work status (as in Table 3-C 2) 
             
Actual values  0.302  0.580  0.118  0.319  0.527  0.154 
Baseline predictions             
  using own values of  
  earnings, work status 
0.311  0.576  0.113  0.325  0.525  0.150 
  using average values of  
  earnings, work status 
0.310  0.579  0.111  0.323  0.530  0.147 
Predictions if …             
   switch average earnings  0.282  0.590  0.128  0.266  0.545  0.189 
   switch earnings, work  0.275  0.593  0.132  0.263  0.546  0.191 
   husbands work, wives don’t  0.350  0.558  0.092  0.372  0.509  0.117 
   wives work, husbands don’t  0.253  0.600  0.147  0.270  0.545  0.185 
   
  Based on specifications that control for lifetime earnings, 
work status (adapted from those in Table 3-B 2) 
             
Baseline predictions             
  using own values of earnings,  
  work status 
0.298  0.582  0.120  0.318  0.530  0.153 
 using average values of  
 earnings, work status 
0.298  0.584  0.119  0.315  0.535  0.149 
Predictions if …             
   switch average earnings  0.243  0.602  0.155  0.197  0.551  0.253 
   switch earnings, work  0.236  0.604  0.160  0.193  0.550  0.258 
   husbands work, wives don’t  0.330  0.568  0.101  0.375  0.510  0.115 
   wives work, husbands don’t  0.250  0.602  0.148  0.273  0.547  0.180 
         
         
Predicted probabilities, averaged over the estimation sample, based on the bivariate ordered probit estimates 
reported in Table 3. 
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TABLE 6 
Consequences of decision making power  
Impact on wealth 
         
  Dependent variable:  Log household wealth 
     
  Characteristics of husband:  Characteristics of wife: 
   
A.  Use continuous information on true decision-making power y* 
   
  (1)  Efficient estimation (correct standard errors) 
  Based on current earnings specification (3-A) 
husband’s decision-making power  -0.0971     (0.2471) 
age    0.0284
*** (0.0061)     0.0383
*** (0.0064) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0236     (0.0155)    -0.0234
*   (0.0134) 
current household earnings  0.0622
*** (0.0061) 
long time horizon    0.0973
*** (0.0368)     0.1295
*** (0.0379) 
risk averse    0.0311
*    (0.0179)     0.0038     (0.0183) 
  Based on average past earnings specification (3-B 2) 
husband’s decision-making power  0.8217
*** (0.2281) 
age    0.0185
*** (0.0063)     0.0404
*** (0.0069) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0324
**  (0.0133)    -0.0345
**  (0.0136) 
average household earnings  0.3162
*** (0.0203) 
  Based on ratio of earnings specification (3-C 5) 
with control for current earnings 
husband’s decision-making power  0.2927    (0.3111) 
age    0.0288
*** (0.0061)     0.0400
*** (0.0061) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0097     (0.0158)    -0.0189    (0.0144) 
log(current household earnings)  0.3296
*** (0.0357) 
  with control for average past earnings 
husband’s decision-making power  0.5442    (0.3504) 
Age    0.0256
*** (0.0068)     0.0360
*** (0.0070) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0253     (0.0166)    -0.0319
**  (0.0165) 
log(average household earnings)  0.3555
*** (0.0493) 
     
  (2)  Two-stage estimation (incorrect standard errors) 
Selected variables:  Based on current earnings specification (3-A) 
husband’s decision-making power  0.1528    (0.2550) 
age    0.0320
*** (0.0072)     0.0372
*** (0.0078) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0478
**  (0.0193)    -0.0415
*   (0.0161) 
log(current household earnings)  0.0256
*** (0.0090) 
long time horizon    0.1168
*** (0.0399)     0.1313
***  (0.0409) 
risk averse    0.0279     (0.0194)    -0.0096     (0.0202) 
  Based on average past earnings specification (3-B 2) 
husband’s decision-making power  -0.0663    (0.2615) 
age    0.0206
*** (0.0079)    0.0380
*** (0.0090) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0440
**  (0.0175)   -0.0359
**  (0.0165) 
log(average household earnings)  0.3741
*** (0.0514)  
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  Based on ratio of earnings specification (3-C 5) 
with control for current earnings 
husband’s decision-making power   0.4064
*   (0.2342) 
age    0.0338
*** (0.0073)    0.0374
*** (0.0078) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0430
**  (0.0181)   -0.0390
**  (0.0159) 
log(current household earnings)  0.0325
*** (0.0093) 
  with control for average past earnings 
husband’s decision-making power   0.2092    (0.2671) 
age    0.0263
*** (0.0083)    0.0344
*** (0.0090) 
   husband’s power*age    0.0414
**  (0.0194)   -0.0362
*   (0.0187) 
log(average household earnings)  0.3698
*** (0.0493) 
   
B.  Use discrete information on reported decision-making power y
h, y
w  
   
  (1)  Information reported by husband  
husband reports:  he has final say  -0.0408     (0.1239) 
      “about equal”  -0.1118     (0.1129) 
age-50   -0.0026     (0.0131)       0.0540
*** (0.0142) 
      husband has final say *age    0.0407
*** (0.0150)      -0.0300
**  (0.0151) 
      “about equal”*age    0.0318
**  (0.0135)      -0.0139     (0.0149) 
   
  (2)  Information reported by wife  
wife reports:  he has final say   0.0047     (0.1113) 
      “about equal”   0.0436     (0.1032) 
age-50    0.0032     (0.0126)       0.0512
*** (0.0122) 
      husband has final say *age    0.0412
*** (0.0137)      -0.0294
**  (0.0130) 
      “about equal”*age    0.0186
      (0.0127)      -0.0102     (0.0122) 
         
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, 1992. 
Sample:  N = 4077 when current earnings are included or 2983 when average past earnings are included.  Other 
control variables besides earnings are those reported in Table 3-A , along with subjective life expectancy.  See text 
for more details.  
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TABLE 7 
Consequences of decision making power 
Impact on stock market investments 
         
  Dependent variable:  Household investment in equities 
     
  Probit 
Invests in equities (1, 0) 
[marginal effect in brackets] 
Tobit 
Share of financial assets 
invested in equities 
     
Mean value  0.32  0.17 
   
A.  Use continuous information on true decision-making power y* 
   
  (1)  Efficient estimation (correct standard errors) 
  Based on current earnings specification (3-A) 
Restrict effect of sum of current earnings 
husband’s decision-making power   0.3689     (0.2567) [0.1232]  0.0774      (0.1390) 
age-50:  husband   0.0097     (0.0080) [0.0032]  0.0031      (0.0046) 
      wife   0.0262
*** (0.0086) [0.0087]  0.0122
***  (0.0050) 
current household earnings   0.0490
*** (0.0069) [0.0163]  0.0202
***  (0.0031) 
long time horizon:  husband   0.1329
*** (0.0464) [0.0444]  0.0651
***  (0.0265) 
      wife   0.1397
*** (0.0475) [0.0466]  0.0628
***  (0.0271) 
risk averse:  husband  -0.0172    (0.0212) [-0.0058]      -0.0042      (0.0121) 
      wife    0.0166     (0.0220) [0.0056]  0.0059     (0.0126) 
  Based on average past earnings specification (3-B 2) 
Restrict effect of sum of average earnings 
husband’s decision-making power  1.1700
**** (0.2926) [0.3981]  0.6626
***  (0.1537) 
average household earnings  0.2926
*** (0.0271) [0.0996]  0.1619
***  (0.0148) 
  Based on ratio of earnings specification (3-C 5) 
with control for current earnings 
husband’s decision-making power  0.5998
*    (0.3558) [0.2002]  0.3182      (0.2001) 
log(current household earnings)  0.1656
*** (0.0329) [0.0553]  0.0878
***  (0.0187) 
  with control for average past earnings 
husband’s decision-making power  1.2523
*** (0.4088) [0.4262]  0.6874
***  (0.2198) 
log(average household earnings)  0.3555
*** (0.0493) [0.1174]  0.1966
***  (0.0256) 
   
  (2)  Two-stage estimation (incorrect standard errors) 
Selected variables:  Based on current earnings specification (3-A) 
husband’s decision-making power  0.5425
**  (0.2556)  [0.1811]  0.3080
**   (0.1414) 
age-50:  husband  0.0035     (0.0081)  [0.0012]  0.0009      (0.0047) 
      wife  0.0273
*** (0.0086) [0.0091]  0.0137
*** (0.0050) 
log(current household earnings)  0.0171
**  (0.0087)  [0.0057]  0.0113
**   (0.0050) 
long time horizon:  husband  0.1330
*** (0.0461)  [0.0447]  0.0651
**   (0.0267) 
      wife  0.1186
*** (0.0473)  [0.0399]  0.0479
*    (0.0272) 
risk averse:  husband  -0.0306    (0.0212) [-0.0102]  -0.0121      (0.0122) 
      wife   0.0065     (0.0219)  [0.0022]  0.0019     (0.0127) 
  Based on average past earnings specification (3-B 2) 
husband’s decision-making power  0.3963     (0.2881) [0.1349]  0.2705
*    (0.1537)  
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log(average household earnings)  0.3615
***  (0.0480) [0.1230]  0.2138
*** (0.0270) 
  Based on ratio of earnings specification (3-C 5) 
with control for current earnings 
husband’s decision-making power  0.7521
*** (0.2218) [0.2510]  0.4098
*** (0.1248) 
log(current household earnings)  0.0246
***  (0.0090) [0.0082]  0.0154
*** (0.0052) 
  with control for average past earnings 
husband’s decision-making power  0.7928
*** (0.2532) [0.2698]  0.4100
*** (0.1365) 
log(average household earnings)  0.3443
***  (0.0459) [0.1172]  0.2004
*** (0.0257) 
   
B.  Use discrete information on reported decision-making power y
h, y
w  
   
  (1)  Information reported by husband  
husband reports:  he has final say   0.1490
*  (0.0827) [0.0505]      0.1137
**  (0.0473) 
      “about equal”  -0.0400 (0.0765) [-0.0133]      0.0069    (0.0442) 
   
  (2)  Information reported by wife 
wife reports:  he has final say   0.0791  (0.0727) [0.0266]      0.0473
    (0.0424) 
      “about equal”   0.0150  (0.0675) [0.0050]      0.0017    (0.0397) 
         
Data:  Health and Retirement Study, 1992. 
Sample:  N = 4237 when current earnings are included or 3087 when average past earnings are included.  Other 
control variables besides earnings are those reported in Table 3-A , along with subjective life expectancy.  See text 
for more details. 
 